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We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill 
levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two 
governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the 
informational asymmetry and increases employment of the less productive individuals. When 
countries are heterogeneous, this effect is more pronounced in the smaller country. 
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Recent years have seen a surge of research on tax competition. This is of
little surprise, as in our globalized world the borders are becoming increas-
ingly open; people, goods, and resources increasingly mobile; and government
policies more interdependent. Nowadays, there is little doubt that a tax pol-
icy neglecting cross-border e⁄ects is no more than a (possibly convenient)
abstraction.
A wide range of problems have been addressed within this blooming ￿eld,
from tax-base erosion to redistribution and allocation of resources to coor-
dination and harmonization proposals. Sinn (2003) provides an excellent
overview of tax competition literature within a broader framework of sys-
tems competition. Capital tax competition has perhaps the longest tradi-
tion, as capital has early been recognized to be a mobile factor of production
and, correspondingly, a most mobile tax base (for a seminal contribution,
see Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986). Income tax competition has also been
analyzed, but mostly insofar as the mobile factors could a⁄ect it. Lately,
mobility of individuals also has come into focus, especially in the context of
European integration (e.g., Richter 2004).
Our paper contributes to this new strand of literature by merging tax
competition for mobile labor with optimal-income-taxation approaches1. In a
novel article, Simula and Trannoy (2010) analyze how migration possibilities
a⁄ect the optimal taxation formula in a single country. Although our paper is
also based on connecting optimal taxation with labor mobility, unlike Simula
and Trannoy we focus on the e⁄ect of tax competition on the employment of
low-skilled workers.
We augment a standard two-skill-level optimal-income-taxation model
with the possibility of migration for high-skilled workers. In this framework
governments compete for these workers and their taxes in a simple Hotelling
setting.
The main result of our analysis is that opening the borders increases em-
ployment of the low-skill workers. Intuitively, competitive pressure lowers
the tax on the mobile high-skill workers. This allows the government to re-
duce the distortion from taxing the low-skilled without violating the incentive
1Huber (1999) studies the e⁄ect of capital tax competition on the optimal income tax
when labor is immobile. Osmundsen et al. (2000) analyze optimal income tax with mobile
labor, but the asymmetric information in their model is about location preferences rather
than productivity. Osmundsen et al. (1998) study a similar problem for ￿rms.
2compatibility constraint. As a result, their employment increases. This is a
clear, testable prediction that is robust to the choice of various objectives of
the government and the relative size of the countries.
We also show that the smaller country lowers its tax on the high-skilled
by more than the larger country does. This is consistent with the general
intuition that the smaller entity is more aggressive in competition, as it has
less revenue to lose from its own population, but a larger competitor￿ s tax
base to gain from lowering the tax.
There is a clear contribution of our result to the policy discussion about
the vices and virtues of tax competition: despite a negative e⁄ect on tax
revenues, it also has a positive e⁄ect on the employment of low-skilled work-
ers. This may be particularly important for the countries with low e¢ ciency
of the government sector, as tax competition tames Leviathan governments
and improves the resource allocation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains the
basic Leviathan model; in section 3 alternative government objectives are
discussed; in section 4 the model with asymmetric equilibrium is analyzed;
limitations and extensions are discussed in the conclusion.
2 The Model
2.1 Closed economy
We use as a benchmark Stiglitz￿ s (1982) version of the Mirrlees (1971) model
of income taxation, but introduce a di⁄erent objective of the government. In
a closed economy, individuals of measure 1 have identical preferences that
can be represented by a utility function u(x;y), where x ￿ 0 is consumption
and 0 ￿ y ￿ 1 is the time worked. u is a strictly concave, continuously
di⁄erentiable function, strictly increasing in x and strictly decreasing in y.
There are two types of individuals in the economy: those with high pro-
ductivity ￿H constitute measure ￿, and those with low productivity ￿L have
correspondingly measure 1￿￿; ￿H > ￿L > 0. An individual of type i provides
zi = ￿iyi of labor while investing yi of her time.
The government cannot observe ￿, but it does observe income z and
chooses income taxes ftL;tHgjti￿zi to maximize the tax revenue
R = ￿tH + (1 ￿ ￿)tL
3subject to a satisfaction constraint uL;uH ￿ u0. This constraint makes it
impossible for the living conditions of the poor to be set arbitrarily low and
may be interpreted as a requirement of a modern welfare state.
In a separating equilibrium, the individual i then chooses (xi;yi) that
maximizes u(x;y) subject to xi ￿ ￿iyi ￿ ti, and corresponding incentive
compatibility (IC) and participation constraints. For simplicity we assume
that the utility thresholds that ensure participation are equal to u0.
It is well known that the budget constraints, the IC constraint for the
high type, and the participation constraint for the low type are binding in
such problems (e.g., Stiglitz 1982). The individual optimization will result
in setting consumption and time for the low type at the levels satisfying
xi = ￿iyi ￿ ti;
￿i (1 ￿ t
0
i)ux + uy = 0:
The Leviathan will then leave the less productive with their reservation util-
ity, setting tL to satisfy
u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿L) = u0;
and tH to satisfy
u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿H) = u(zH ￿ tH;yH)
and the revenue maximization condition. The government will not ￿nd itself
better o⁄in a pooling equilibrium in our setting, as shown by Stiglitz (1982).
Nothing guarantees, however, that the corner with zL = 0 is not hit.
Writing down the maximization explicitly (and in line with the literature),
we can de￿ne the marginal tax rate as
t
0




We set up the Lagrangian L = ￿tH+(1 ￿ ￿)tL+￿(u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿L) ￿ u0)+
￿(u(zH ￿ tH;zH=￿H) ￿ u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿H)) and denote for compactness uL :=
u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿L);uH := (zH ￿ tH;zH=￿H);uHL := u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿H). The
corresponding FOCs are
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4The last equation immediately produces a ￿no distortion at the top￿result:
uH
x + uH
y =￿H = 0 =) t0
H = 0. From quasiconcavity, dx=dy = ￿uy=ux is an





x . Correspondingly, uHL
x + uHL
y =￿H > uH
x + uH
y =￿H = 0, and from
(1b) uL
x + uL
y=￿L > 0, so that t0
L > 0.
Denote the optimal tax rates in the autarky case by fta
L;ta
Hg.
The appendix shows that for a su¢ ciently high level of ￿ the low-skilled
will ￿nd it optimal not to participate in the labor force (za
L = 0). In what
follows we assume that ￿ is su¢ ciently low.
2.2 Open economy
Suppose now we have two identical economies of the sort described above.
Additionally, high-productivity individuals may migrate between countries in
search of a better life. Low-productivity individuals are immobile. This is an
extreme case of correlation between productivity and mobility decision, and
we employ it for the sake of simplicity. Simula and Trannoy (2010) discuss
why it seems reasonable to assume that higher-skilled workers are also more
mobile. For example, skilled workers have better language skills and should
have easier access to information on foreign countries.
Our high-productivity individuals di⁄er in their propensity to migrate.
Speci￿cally, we assume that individuals populate the interval [0;1] accord-
ing to a continuously di⁄erentiable distribution function F (a). Under this
assumption we can use a Hotelling model for the analysis. Basically, our
migration costs are similar in spirit to switching costs widely analyzed in the
Industrial Organization literature (e.g., Farrell and Klemperer 2007). The
utility of the high-productivity individual located at a is u(x;y)￿c(a), where
c is a strictly increasing function with c(0) = 0. Thus, we assume that utility
is additively separable with respect to migration costs.
One caveat related to this analysis is that upon migration the government
can observe the type of individual and thus impose a perfect-information tax
on her (or any other tax conditioned upon the fact of migration and hence
potentially di⁄erent than the tax on the rest of population). However, we
can exclude such behavior by postulating that the government must treat mi-
grants and nonmigrants equally (and this is indeed the case in many countries
that have antidiscrimination laws) for the sake of horizontal equity.






in two countries, if tA
H < tB
H, all the















will migrate to country A; and analogously for country











+ (1 ￿ ￿)t
A
L
subject to the participation constraint
u(￿LyL ￿ tL;yL) = u0;
the incentive compatibility constraint
u(￿HyL ￿ tL;yL) ￿ u(￿HyH ￿ tH;yH);
which does not have to be binding any more, and individual rationality
￿i (1 ￿ t
0
i)ux + uy = 0:
The solution to this program for given tB
H will give us a best-response function
for country A. Writing this up a bit more explicitly, we have





























+(1 ￿ ￿)tL+￿(u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿L) ￿ u0)+
￿(u(zH ￿ tH;zH=￿H) ￿ u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿H)), where ￿ ￿ 0 and we omit super-
script A for more parsimonious notation. The ￿rst order conditions are now


































x = 0; (3c)


















First, we can see that the conditions of the less productive are not a⁄ected
by the migration possibility of the high-skilled. Second, the ￿no distortion
at the top￿result is still preserved, regardless of whether the IC constraint is
2To be concise, we do not explicitly consider the case with tA
H > tB
H. However, it is easy
to see that our formulation remains valid in this complementary case, if we additionally
de￿ne functions c and F on the interval [￿1;0] by c(￿a) = ￿c(a) and F (￿a) = ￿F (a).
6still binding. Indeed, as in the last expression ￿tHf (^ a)c￿10 (:) + ￿ is strictly
positive, it is necessary that at the optimum uH
x + uH
y =￿H = 0, that is,
t0
H = 0. Third, the FOC with respect to tH has now an additional term R ^ a
0 dF (a) ￿ tHf (^ a)c￿10 (:)uH
x . If the IC constraint were not binding, the
choice of the tax on high-productivity individuals would be a simple trade-
o⁄ between increasing the tax base and reducing the tax rate to maximize














The shadow value of the constraint is changed from ￿=uH








x ￿ ￿tHf (^ a)c￿10 (:) in the open economy.
It is not clear whether the IC constraint may become nonbinding, but in






= 0, and we have
no distortion at the bottom: uL
x +uL
y=￿L = 0 as long as the participation con-
straint for the low-productivity individuals is binding. This is a remarkable
result: in our model tax competition is a simple way to tame Leviathan, and
it might even restore ￿rst-best solution in some cases.
Example 1 In the extreme case of no switching costs, Bertrand competi-
tion decreases the tax rates to zero. This is indeed an equilibrium if u0 ￿
u(zH (tH = 0);zH (0)=￿L).
The best response of country A is de￿ned by the equations (3a)￿ (3d) and
(2). By the inverse function theorem, c￿10 (:) = 1=c0 (:). We now look at a
















H. The condition (3c)















and together with the conditions (3a)￿ (3d) it de￿nes a symmetric Nash equi-
librium in our model.
Notice that c0 (0) re￿ ects intensity of competition: for c0 (0) = 0 there is
no heterogeneity with respect to migration decision, so there is e⁄ectively
Bertrand competition; for c0 (0) ! 1 competition becomes ine⁄ective, and
we have the following lemma.
7Lemma 1 Consider autarky equilibrium tax rates fta
L;ta
Hg. For c0 (0) ! 1,






Proof. Starting from autarky equilibrium values, from (1c) ￿ ￿ ￿uH
x = 0.
The condition (3c) as a best response to autarky equilibrium in another
country can be rewritten as ￿￿tHuH
x f (0)=c0 (0) < 0, so there is an incentive
to cut the tax, but this incentive vanishes in the limit of unbounded slope of
the switching cost function.
Thus, the autarky equilibrium is a limiting case of open-economy equi-
librium with no e⁄ective tax competition.
Proposition 1 Tax competition lowers the tax on the high-skilled, to
H < ta
H.




H is not feasible:
since the IC constraint is binding in autarky, a tax higher than in autarky
on the ￿rich￿is not possible without increasing the tax on the ￿poor￿ . But
if that were possible without violating their participation constraint, such an








Proof. From Proposition 1 we know that to
H < ta
H. If the IC constraint is
binding, along this constraint dzH=dzL < 0 (see appendix). Since dzH=dtH >
0 from the condition of no distortion at the top, zo
L > za
L. If the IC constraint
is not binding, from the condition of no distortion at the bottom, zo
L > za
L.
The propositions assume existence of the equilibrium, and we establish it
in the appendix.
An interesting policy-relevant observation obtains immediately: tax com-
petition contributes to the employment of low-skilled labor, which is obvi-
ously a virtue. While such an increase does not improve the lot of the low-
skilled, tax competition bene￿ts the high-skilled at the expense of Leviathan.
Conversely, tax coordination (autarky in our model) would increase tax rev-
enue, but would be inferior to tax competition in terms of the employment
and utility of the high-skilled3.
3It can be noted that tax competition is not necessarily welfare-improving in models
of Leviathan governments. See Edwards and Keen (1996) for details.
83 Alternative objectives of the government
3.1 Rawlsian government
Suppose now government is not interested in its own rents, but has Rawlsian
preferences, that is, it wants to maximize the utility of the low-productivity
individuals subject to some budget constraint. The corresponding Lagrangian
is then









+ (1 ￿ ￿)tL
￿
.
We immediately see that the structure of the problem does not change, so
the structure of the solution to it stays the same. The di⁄erence is that
whereas Leviathan takes all the rents away from the ￿poor￿ , the Rawlsian
government, to the contrary, maximizes them. The FOCs are now






























x = 0; (5c)


















To see that this set of FOCs is equivalent to (3a)￿ (3d), divide them
through by ￿ and re-denote ￿1 = 1=￿, ￿1 = ￿=￿. Then Lemma 1 and
the no-distortion results go through. Proposition 1 still holds, because the
Rawlsian government does not want to increase the tax on the ￿poor￿ , and
an increase in the tax on the ￿rich￿is not possible without violating the IC
constraint. Proposition 2 then remains intact, as it uses Proposition 1, the
IC constraint (or no distortion at the bottom), and the ￿no distortion at the
top￿results.
Intuitively, it makes little di⁄erence whether the government wishes to
tax the high-skilled to maximize its own rent or the utility of the poor. In
both situations mobility of the high-skilled tends to ease the self-selection
constraint that the government has to respect, allowing the poor to be less
rationed on the labor market.
While in the Leviathan model tax competition has kept the utility of the
poor constant, in the Rawlsian model their utility goes down and only the
utility of the high-skilled goes up.
93.2 Utilitarian government
Now consider the probably most popular formulation, in which the govern-
ment wants to maximize the sum of the utility of the individuals. A problem
here is that it is not clear whether the utility of new immigrants should en-
ter the government￿ s objective. Given that in reality obtaining citizenship is
often a long and painful process, we assume that the government cares only
about the established residents. Then the Lagrangian is
L = ￿u(zH ￿ tH;zH=￿H) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(zL ￿ tL;zL=￿L)








+ (1 ￿ ￿)tL
￿
.
The corresponding FOCs are




x = 0; (6a)
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x = 0; (6c)


















This is not exactly equivalent to the previous problem, but we can immedi-
ately see that the ￿no distortion at the top￿result survives, and so does the
￿no distortion at the bottom￿in the case of a nonbinding IC constraint. The
same is true for Lemma 1. In Proposition 1, the government has no incentive
to increase taxes, as it cares about the utility of the ￿rich￿ . Proposition 2
holds by the same reasoning as with Rawlsian government.
To sum up, our result about the e⁄ect of tax competition on employment
of the ￿poor￿is robust to the changes in the speci￿cation of government￿ s
objective function.
4 Asymmetric countries
Suppose now that the two countries we consider are of di⁄erent size. Assume
that whereas country B still has population of measure 1, country A has
a population of measure m > 1. Otherwise the countries are identical; in
particular, a is still distributed on a unit interval, only in the country A
every point is m times more populated.
The following two FOCs are changed for the Leviathan in country A (we
consider here the more relevant case of tA
H > tB
H):

















x = 0: (7b)













x = 0: (8)
We see that, compared to the symmetric situation, the relative impor-
tance of tax competition terms is increased for the small country (B) and
reduced for the large country (A). Notice that Propositions 1 and 2 do not
hinge on the symmetry assumption, so they are still valid in the asymmetric
setup. The existence proof, however, uses symmetry and has to be reestab-
lished (see appendix).
Intuitively, the small country is more aggressive in tax competition, since
it has more to gain (through attracting a foreign tax base) and less to lose
from it (through reduced taxes from the home tax base). This is con￿rmed
by the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium of the asymmetric game, tA
H > tB
H.
Proof. Suppose the contrary is true. The case of tA
H = tB
H is clearly inconsis-
tent with the sets of FOC above. Consider the case of tA
H < tB
H. In equilibrium
the gain of each country from marginally changing the tax rate should be zero.




0 dF (a) ￿ tB
Hf (^ a)=c0 (^ a)
￿
+
(1 ￿ ￿)dtL=dtH = 0, where dtL=dtH is taken along the binding constraints
(participation, IC, and no distortion at the top), and hence must be iden-





0 dF (a) ￿ tA
Hf (^ a)=c0 (^ a)
￿




0 dF (a) ￿ tA
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f (^ a)=c0 (^ a)
￿
> 0, so country A is bet-
ter o⁄ raising its tax. Thus, the case tA
H < tB
H cannot be an equilibrium.
11While more aggressive behavior of the smaller country is a robust result
in tax competition models (e.g., Hau￿ er 2001, ch. 5), Proposition 3 allows
us to formulate a new testable hypothesis: The positive e⁄ect of opening
borders on employment of low-skilled workers is more pronounced in a small
country.
5 Conclusion
We have analyzed tax competition in a simple optimal-income-taxation model.
We show that the tax on the high-skilled decreases and employment of the
low-skilled increases with respect to autarky. Our results are robust to a
number of modi￿cations concerning the government￿ s objective function and
symmetry of the two competing countries.
There are important limitations that we share with many optimal-taxation
models. First, there is no account of capital, although it should be even more
mobile than high-skilled labor. We focus on income taxation because we want
to clearly identify the e⁄ect of combining competition with the principal￿
agent framework that underlies optimal taxation models. Second, due to
the simple linear production technology in one good economy, there are no
general-equilibrium or trade e⁄ects of the wage changes that could lead to
repercussions on the e⁄ects discussed.
We see several new directions for future research in the framework we have
considered. Extensions of our model could assume countries that di⁄er with
respect to the national objective function or could allow for some mobility of
low-skilled workers. We also hope that this paper will encourage empirical
work on the labor market e⁄ects of migration opportunities. Based on our
model, we would expect that tax competition for mobile high-skilled workers
has more pronounced implications for low-skilled workers in small countries.
6 Appendix
6.1 To Proposition 2
Recall that ux > 0;uy < 0;uxx < 0;uyy < 0. From the participation con-











































. From strict concavity we have u2
xy <
uxxuyy, so this requirement is satis￿ed for a large class of concave functions.
Moreover, dzH=dtH < 1, under our assumption on the cross-derivative uH
yx.




x (1 ￿ t0
L (zL)) + uHL
y =￿H
uH
x (1 ￿ t0
H (zH)) + uH
y =￿H
:
The denominator is negative, since t0









y ￿L. Since dy=dx is larger for






























































Thus, the IC constraint combined with two other ones determines that dzH=dzL <
0.
It seems logical then that Leviathan will want to force the poor not to
work and the rich to work as much as possible and to tax them as much as
possible as well, but there are some limits to it:




L > 0. Then a small reduction in zL will lead to an increase
in zH that will keep IC constraint satis￿ed. From the participation and ￿no
distortion at the top￿constraints, that will also reduce tL and increase tH by
amounts dtL=dzL < 1 and dtH=dzH > 1 correspondingly. Obviously, as long
as ￿ >
dtL=dzL
(dtH=dzH)(￿dzH=dzL)+dtL=dzL, such a change will increase tax revenue
without violating any constraint. Thus, at the optimum za
L = 0.
We notice also that in situations with za
L = 0 we must have ta
L < 0 from
the participation constraint.
6.2 On the Existence of Equilibrium
6.2.1 Symmetric model
The existence of the equilibrium in our game hinges on two assumptions: (i)
the conditions (3a)￿ (3d) and (2) de￿ne best responses; (ii) the intersection
of these best responses is nonempty. For (i) it is necessary and su¢ cient
that the conditions de￿ne an interior solution and second-order conditions
are satis￿ed (they actually are, given our assumptions on the utility function
and appropriate assumptions on the functions c and F, plus any parameter
restrictions that ensure an interior solution). For (ii) we have to study the
best response on the interval [0;ta
H]. By proposition 1 it is necessary and
su¢ cient that the best response intersect the 45￿ line on this interval. There
are no discontinuities in our problem, so the best-response function must
be continuous. As we have shown, BR(ta
H) < ta
H. On the other hand,
BR(0) ￿ 0, as a negative tax on the rich can not be revenue-maximizing.
By continuity then there exists an intersection (or intersections) with the
45￿ line on the interval [0;ta
H], and hence an equilibrium exists. Moreover,
this equilibrium (or equilibria) is symmetric, because the best responses are
identical.
6.2.2 Asymmetric model
We follow the same logic as for the symmetric situation. The appropriate
parameter restrictions ensure that conditions from (i), modi￿ed correspond-
ingly as in (7a)￿ (8), de￿ne best responses. For (ii), we need the two best
responses to intersect. It is still true that BR(ta
H) < ta
H and BR(0) ￿ 0 for
each country, so by continuity there exists at least one intersection on the
interval [0;ta
H].
146.3 On the Uniqueness
The symmetric equilibrium analyzed is unique whenever the system of equa-
tions (3a)￿ (3d), (2), and tA
H = tB
H has a unique solution.
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